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THE GRAY (GOODS) ELEPHANT IN THE
ROOM: CHINA’S TROUBLING ATTITUDE
TOWARD IP PROTECTION OF GRAY
MARKET GOODS
INTRODUCTION: HUNGRY FOR THE FIRST BITE OF THE APPLE

S

eptember 17, 2010: Apple’s newest, hottest release, the iPad®,
successfully debuted in China,1 one of the world’s largest markets.
This was an achievement for Apple® after the disastrous launch of the
Chinese iPhone® in 2009,2 when the typically dynamic company could
not move stock from the shelves.3 The reason? Interested Chinese buyers
had long owned iPhones®. Apple’s iPhone® debut in China lagged nearly two years behind its introduction to the United States and Europe.4
Many Chinese consumers ordered hacked and reprogrammed phones,
shipped in from hubs like Prague and New York.5 Some of the phones
made an even shorter journey as they simply “leaked” into the market
from the Chinese factories where they were produced.6 Apple’s global
vision was no match for the dynamic gray market.
The gray market, or parallel market,7 occurs when goods intended for
one market are redirected, unauthorized, to another.8 The goods literally

1. Loretta Chao, China Gets the iPad, WALL ST. J. CHINA REAL TIME BLOG (Sept.
17, 2010, 5:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/09/17/china-gets-the-ipad/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Compare Matthew Honan, Apple Unveils iPhone, MACWORLD (Jan. 9, 2007),
http://www.macworld.com/article/54769/2007/01/iphone.html, with Chao, supra note 1
(providing date of iPhone debut in China).
5. Peter Burrows, Inside the iPhone Gray Market, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb.
12,
2008),
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2008/tc20080211_152894.htm.
6. Id.
7. A “gray good” belonging in the “gray market,” as defined by the United States, is
“a foreign-manufactured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported
without the consent of the United States trademark holder.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988). Thus, the phrase is technically very narrow. However, this
concept has been extended and is often used interchangeably with similar provisions for
patented and copyrighted materials, such as “parallel market,” and need not be manufactured abroad. DAVID R. SUGDEN, GRAY MARKETS: PREVENTION, DETECTION AND
LITIGATION 4 (2009); Stefan M. Miller, Parallel Imports: Towards a Flexible Uniform
International Rule, 15 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 21, 22 (2009). In this Note, “gray good”
and “gray market” are used as general terminology indicating products imported through
unauthorized channels. However, “parallel import” refers to the verb, due to nuance.
“Parallel import,” referring to goods, is only used for clarity while mentioning both gray
goods and the black market.
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parallel those imported through the authorized channel. For example,
“Business” authorizes ten units to be sold to a retailer in country A and
five to be sold to a separate retailer in country B, pricing the same goods
differently to target specific markets. Business is unaware that the retailer in B resells its units to stores in A and C. The stores in A and C have
just engaged in parallel importation. Essentially, Business ends up competing with itself, as its lower priced goods destined for B compete
against the higher priced goods in A’s market. The purpose of this indirect importation is often to supply the product to a void, like the iPhone’s
initial China release, but more likely, it is to undersell the goods intended
for that market.9 Essentially, those who parallel import from cheaper nations can sell the same product at a lower price than those who use the
authorized channel.
Americans today are familiar with the gray market as it affects them.
Stores like Costco stock their shelves with affordably priced products
often redirected from foreign locales.10 Textbooks ordered from the internet arrive in College Hill by way of Hong Kong. 11 Westerners are
comfortable importing goods on a whim from major developing countries like China. Seldom, however, do Westerners contemplate China’s
own massive economy and subsequent pull on the gray market.
Some may see parallel imports as a fair extension of the global marketplace.12 This does, after all, allow companies to reach new markets.13
However, the gray market expert David R. Sugden explained, “As the
name aptly suggests, gray market goods reside in the murky area of law
between legitimacy and illegality.”14 Many large companies distributing
products globally find grounds to litigate, 15 and governments are concerned, too, as they miss out on potential sales tax revenue on the autho-

8. Jorge Espinosa, What is the Parallel Market?, THE GRAY BLOG (last visited Sept.
30, 2010), http://espinosaiplaw.com/wordpress/?page_id=5.
9. For an illustration of this concept, see WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS
1 (1993).
10. Daniel Fisher, Costco v. Omega Tests the Power of a Logo, FORBES ON THE
DOCKET
BLOG
(Apr.
19,
2010,
6:53
PM),
http://blogs.forbes.com/docket/2010/04/19/costco-v-omega-tests-power-of-a-logo.
11. See Jeff Shelstad, The Demise of the $200 Textbook, GOOD (July 8, 2010),
http://www.good.is/post/the-demise-of-the-200-textbook.
12. See SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 30–31.
13. Id. at 60–62. Pricing appropriately for the destination ensures that an article has a
better chance of selling in that new market. Id.
14. Id. at 4–5.
15. See SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 297–309 (describing approaches companies may
pursue globally.)
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rized product’s higher price.16 Additionally, governments are concerned
about the lack of regulation of gray market goods—when unauthorized—
products used or even ingested by consumers may be tampered with or of
inferior quality.17 Not only does the gray market pose risks and disrupt a
company’s profitability, it also poses problems for the entity’s intellectual property rights (“IPR”).18
Companies may have trademark, patent, and copyright claims from the
unauthorized sale and importation of goods.19 Trademarks help identify a
company’s products and services by distinguishing them from similar
ones20 with the purpose of establishing “goodwill.”21 They may be symbols, words, names, or devices, among other indicators.22 Copyright protects expression of an idea through original works of authorship, be it a
fine painting, video game, or logo design.23 Concerned companies may
defend products bearing copyrighted logos, copyrightable content, or a
trademark through various intellectual property laws.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Costco v. Omega24 catapulted
the gray market to the top of American and other Western countries’ attention. 25 Following similar U.S. cases where trademark infringement
16. For a discussion of the tax implications of black market goods, see id. at 56–59.
17. Lack of control over one’s products opens parallel imports to typical black market
problems. Id. at 5–6. However, quality control issues may arise from a manufacturer
itself. For example, Tic Tacs intended for different markets feature different ingredients
and Abercrombie sells lower quality clothing to foreign markets. Id. at 16–18. Consumers
may be unaware that they are purchasing lesser goods imported through the parallel market.
18. Intellectual Property is the law of patents, copyrights, and trademarks (among
others). It protects the intangible, and “the law creates the property by defining what will
be protected from others.” DONALD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 1–2 (1994). Essentially, it protects ideas and inventions, expression and works
of authorship, good will and designations of origin. Id. at 2–4.
19. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA 1 (Christopher Heath ed., 2004) [hereinafter
PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA]. This should not distract from the fact that parallel import
issues are mostly economic. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 3.
20. U.K. TRADE & INVESTMENT, U.K. INTELLECTUAL. PROP. OFFICE., HUNTER
RODWELL CONSULTING & ROUSE & CO. INT’L, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIMER
FOR CHINA 9 (2008) [hereinafter CHINA IP PRIMER].
21. Michael A. Ugolini, Gray Market Goods Under the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 462 (1999).
22. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 18, at 81.
23. See id. at 4, 168–69. Logos typically fall under trademark protection but copyright may also be applicable. Compare id. at 186–87, with id. at 154. Patents protect inventions but are not discussed for purposes of this Note. Id. at 2.
24. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
25. This case was highly visible as leading news outlets across the United States reported its developments. See Court Ruling in Costco Case Could Affect Discount Retail-
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action was denied because the items in question were genuine, the Swiss
watchmaker Omega sued Costco for purchasing and selling watches in
the United States that were originally priced and distributed to cheaper
markets. 26 Omega pursued this action through copyright protection,
claiming that its copyrighted logo featured on the underside of the watch
makes the entire watch protectable, and thus this sale violated Omega’s
exclusive control of its copyright.27 The Ninth Circuit determined that the
first sale doctrine, a limit on exclusive control after the first sale, only
applied to goods “legally made” within the United States. 28 Since the
watches were made in Switzerland, Omega could continue its control
over the copyrighted material.29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
and businesses and consumers everywhere waited anxiously for clarification on the right to resell copyrighted material.30 However, the Supreme
Court’s decision further confused matters by affirming Omega’s right to
control without establishing precedent, 31 leaving American resellers,
consumers, and businesses without clear direction.

ers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at B11 [hereinafter Court Ruling in Costco Case Could
Affect Discount Retailers].
26. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2008).
As there were only nine words to the Supreme Court decision, this Note refers to the
lower courts’ discussion of the issues. For an explanation, see Jorge Espinosa, Supreme
Court Will Revisit Quality King Distributors, Inc v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., THE
GRAY BLOG, http://espinosaiplaw.com/wordpress/?p=93 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). For a
possible reason for the split, see Fisher, supra note 10; Greg Stohr, Elena Kagan, the
Absent Supreme Court Justice, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 23, 2010),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_40/b4197031526266.htm.
27. David Kravets, All Rise: Supreme Court’s Geekiest Generation Begins, WIRED
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/supreme-court-2010-2011term.
28. Omega S.A., 541 F.3d at 900.
29. Id.
30. Court Ruling in Costco Case Could Affect Discount Retailers, supra note 25.
31. Supreme Court’s Tie Vote Sustains Swatch Against Costco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2010, at B7. This decision revolved around the “first sale” doctrine, also known as “exhaustion,” which says that copyrightable materials in the form of chattels (tangible objects) may only be controlled by the author during the first sale. Any subsequent reselling
is beyond the author’s control. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT
LAW 328–31 (2010). Costco v. Omega suggests that this could be limited to products
within the United States, providing authors of copyrightable materials manufactured outside of the United States perpetual or at least greater control than those from within the
United States. Supreme Court Rebuffs Costco in Copyright Challenge, FORBES FULL
DISCLOSURE
BLOG
(Dec.
13,
2010,
1:31
PM),
http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/12/13/supreme-court-rebuffs-costco-incopyright-challenge [hereinafter Supreme Court Rebuffs Costco in Copyright Challenge].
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This controversy is not unique to the United States. Regardless of
American laws about the American market, large emerging economies
are clamoring for the same goods as the rest of the world, but at lower
prices. China, well known for its exports, is one of the world’s largest
economies32 with the world’s largest population,33 and is thus naturally a
dynamic importer.34 Over 12% of its $954.3 billion imports35 come from
Japan and another 7.66% from the United States.36 China, as an extremely populous importer of expensive goods, is ripe for parallel importation
issues.
Those attune to IPR around the world should carefully watch the issue
of gray goods. China is already branded with a scarlet ©, as it is often
labeled a “chronic and notorious abuser of IPR.”37 This is particularly
important considering that China today is the third largest trading nation38 and is obligated to protect IPR through a series of treaties.39 Copyright and trademark laws with respect to trade are loosely enforced in
China, and though improving, it is dubious whether China is ready to
address IPR to the same degree as the developed world. This potentially
poses problems for companies hoping to protect against parallel imports
in China by asserting IPR claims.
China shed its Communist regime only a few decades ago, and a new
capitalist market quickly sprung up in its void.40 Although China became
obligated to protect intellectual property upon joining the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) in 198041 and World Trade Organ32. See GORDON C. K. CHEUNG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA: POLITICS
5 (2009).
33. As of July 2010, China’s population was 1,330,141,295. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK, EAST & SOUTHEAST ASIA: CHINA (2010) [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK], available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ch.html (follow “Download Publication” hyperlink).
34. The CIA World Fact Book lists China as the third largest purchasing power and
the sixth largest “real growth rate” in the world. Id.
35. 2009 estimate. Id.
36. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 34.
37. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 306; see also Greg Creer, The International Threat to
Intellectual Property Rights Through Emerging Markets, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 213, 218–19
(2004).
38. Susan Ariel Aaronson, How Disciplining China Could Save the WTO,
VOXEU.ORG (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4581.
39. PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA, at xiii
(Christopher Heath ed., 2005).
40. See Creer, supra note 37, at 213, 218.
41. Treaties and Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. [WIPO],
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=35C (last visited Nov. 10, 2010)
[hereinafter WIPO, Contracting Parties]. The WIPO is a United Nations agency that
OF PIRACY, TRADE AND PROTECTION
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ization (“WTO”) in 2001,42 the concept of intellectual property itself may
be incompatible to Chinese culture. Intellectual property’s concept of the
ownership of the intangible is often regarded as incompatible with socialism’s discouragement of ownership, which still maintains a large Chinese allegiance. 43 Ownership itself may be an amoral concept under
Eastern philosophy,44 posing large problems for a Westernized nuanced
argument against parallel importation.
This Note posits that China’s protection of copyrights and trademarks
for parallel goods will continue to be limited, as demonstrated by recent
judicial decisions, even with the looming possibility of international action. This analysis must be addressed through the lens of Chinese IPR
obligations and enforcement in addition to the gray market. Part I explores the emergence and ambiguous illegality of the gray market. Part II
assesses China’s legal obligations, both internationally and intranationally, to protect copyrights and trademarks, including potential policing of
gray market goods. Part III analyzes China’s erratic enforcement of IPR
as illustrated by the recent Shanghai Unilever Co. Ltd. v. Commercial
Importing and Exporting Trading Co. of Guanghzou Economic Techology Developing District, Hui Zhong Fa Shi Chu Zi and Michelin Group v.
Tan Guoqiang and Ou Can45 cases, among others. Part IV proposes a
possible solution in the face of a world pushing for stricter protections
from the gray market.

seeks reasonable international intellectual property standards. What is WIPO?, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
42. Member Information: China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO],
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010)
[hereinafter WTO, Member Information]. The WTO is an international organization designed to facilitate trade negotiations and policies for member governments. Understanding
the
WTO:
What
We
Do,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21,
2010).
43. Creer, supra note 37, at 220.
44. See id. (explaining that ownership “is suspect to possible illegalities and disgrace”).
45. Most Chinese cases are not available in English, if they have been published at
all. Few primary sources were available at the time of drafting this Note. The author relies on experts’ (practicing attorneys, scholars, and professors) recounting of the decisions. This Note features the most complete case citations possible without actual access.
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I. INTO THE DEEP GRAY OCEAN: AN IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION OF THE
GRAY MARKET
“Globalization . . . is as old as ambition.”46 Even though globalization
is not novel, today it possesses a new instantaneous element, mostly due
to the internet’s free flowing commerce. 47 Although technology transformed humankind’s ability to reach the corners of the world, international trade would not look as it does today without a recent shift in
global political status. Only two decades ago, the world was divided by
ideology and matching trade barriers. With the transformation of physical barriers, “the 1990s became a watershed decade of intangible barrier
removal.”48 In the span of twelve years, the Berlin Wall fell and China
joined the WTO, opening previously quartered off areas of the world for
trade with other nations.49 From these new economies, fueled by technology, the gray market exploded.
Although the gray market’s channels were carved by shifting global
policy and technological advancement, industry itself is instrumental in
supplying the market with product. 50 Sugden asserts that by dumping
inventory to meet short-term sales goals, companies undermine their long
term plans.51 Discount retailers like Marshalls and TJ Maxx then sell the
same products as traditional retail outlets, at much lower prices.
Of more international concern is global pricing strategy. In order to
penetrate international markets and achieve some level of sales success,
companies will price goods to sell in a nation’s specific market.52 However, this has unintended consequences. A company may price a bicycle
for $300 in the United States, but only $250 in Brazil and $180 in Mexico. Businesses in the United States will buy the bicycles from Mexico at
$180, incur the shipping costs, and still be able to sell the bikes for $250
in the United States, underselling those bikes that were priced for the
American market.
Controlling distribution channels prevents underselling as well as other
harms. Black market goods, which may harm consumers and brands, often intermingle with parallel imports that are out of the brand’s control.53
The term gray market itself reflects this possible contamination. Gray
46. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 29.
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id at 37.
49. Id. at 37–38.
50. See id. at 40–41.
51. Id.
52. Espinosa, supra note 8.
53. For discussion of a case study on the intermingling and counterfeit baby formula,
see SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 53.
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market has many definitions including the traditionally illegal,54 but most
accurately refers to “goods diverted from a brand owners’ authorized sale
channel.”55 While industry numbers are disputed,56 the impact of the parallel market is economically significant.
As discussed in the Introduction, in much of the world, parallel importation is not automatically illegal. In fact, it is in line with WTO free
trade principles. 57 Additionally, industry continuously chooses to host
production in countries that are notorious for leaks.58 Companies’ willingness to provide this vulnerability paired with the concept of free trade
creates rampant parallel importation. However, industry’s displeasure
with international markets is substantial as well. Companies and their
parent nations subsequently found a creative way to address this issue:
intellectual property.
Intellectual property is an increasingly important barrier to the gray
market, particularly trademark and copyright.59 It may seem curious that
companies attempting to crack down on parallel importation pursue intellectual property litigation. They are, after all, the same products by the
very same companies, not counterfeit products. However, both trademark
and copyright provide circuitous causes of action for parallel importation. By protecting creative content or a brand, companies may be able to
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. (quoting DAVID M. HOPKINS ET AL., COUNTERFEITING EXPOSED 10 (2003)).
56. Grant Gross, US Panel Looks at Intellectual Property Violations in China, PC
WORLD
(June
15,
2010),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/198901/us_panel_looks_at_intellectual_p
roperty_violations_in_china.html. Some have raised concern that consumers who purchase products at a fraction of the true price are not the same consumers that would buy
the item at its original, elevated price. Peter Yu of Drake University recently suggested
that these markets may even benefit Americans by further disseminating American democratic culture. Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China
Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 425 (2008)
[hereinafter Yu, Three Questions].
57. Miller, supra note 7, at 24. Free trade principles refer to the WTO’s fair competition policy, which is reflected in its “system of rules dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition.” Basics: Principles of the Trading System, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2010) [hereinafter WTO, Principles]. There is a logical tension between free trade principles and the monopoly afforded to IPR holders, but protection stimulates investment.
See ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 8.
58. See SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 102–03.
59. Id. at 5. It is important to note that copyright and trademark are technical and
intricate concepts, and vary among nations, although reciprocity is often available internationally. This brief overview is not intended to fully assess the facets of copyright and
trademark, but instead this Note assumes that one has followed proper copyright or
trademark procedures and has a claim regarding infringement.
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prevent the sale of the underlying good and the corresponding financial
blow.
Trademarks “associate a product with a particular [unique] source,”60
developing consumer trust and loyalty.61 Trademarks include logos, slogans, names, and even physical characteristics of the product.62 Companies argue that the gray market undermines its trademark, and thus destroys public trust of the brand, through dilution 63 and harm to goodwill.64 Avoidance of the authorized distribution channel can create vulnerabilities from lack of warranty or quality control,65 which may actually
make the same product materially different, and thus violative of a product’s trademark.66
Copyright in the United States and other nations is arguably more akin
to traditional property rights than trademarks. 67 Copyright provides a
(limited) right of distribution68 and a right of performance,69 among others, which are useful in two ways. First, copyright offers traditional protection to creative original works like books or software. 70 Publishers
constantly struggle against the stream of books coming from external
markets.71 The second way copyright can be used to protect against gray
goods is slightly less obvious, and arguably weak. Companies may liti60. Id. at 242.
61. “The brand is a contract between a brand owner and its consumers.” Id. at 5.
Since the gray market is often indistinguishable from the authorized, the stolen, and the
counterfeited, weak brand control can destroy consumer confidence. Id. at 5–6.
62. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 9.
63. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 244. Dilution can be either “tarnishment” or “blurring.”
Id. at 244–45.
64. See id. at 257–59.
65. Donna K. Hintz, Battling Gray Market Goods with Copyright Law, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1187, 1189 (1994).
66. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 260–81.
67. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 186.
68. Basic Notions of Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO Int’l Bureau, 6–7,
WIPO/IPTK/MCT/02/INF/10
(Nov.
2001),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/pdf/basic_notions.pdf; see also Tan Leng
Cheo & Partners, Copyright Law and Parallel Imports (Aug. 28, 2001),
http://www.accountlaw-tax.com.sg/Website_tlc/ws-parallel%20import.htm (a discussion
of this right and its possible infringement in the United States and Singapore, with a brief
discussion of Australia as well).
69. INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THEORY AND PRACTICE 155 (WIPO
ed., 1997). A right of performance creates exclusivity in the rights to “perform” video
games, music, and other entertainment articles.
70. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 154.
71. See AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, RESTRICTIONS ON THE PARALLEL
IMPORT
OF
BOOKS
1.1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/90265/books.pdf.
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gate the sale of their goods based on a logo or other designed or written
material attached to a product rather than the product itself.72 However,
countries are often uneasy about allowing trademark or logo protections
to be employed in a manner that acts as a barrier to trade.73
The first sale doctrine is often a limit to IPR and may also be called
“exhaustion of rights” or simply “exhaustion.” After the first sale of a
trademark protected, patented, 74 or copyrighted good, the intellectual
property holder’s rights are literally exhausted, and so the importer is
free from this constraint.75 While this doctrine and its application vary
tremendously worldwide, it is often acknowledged on at least a regional
level.76 Application of this concept can legally facilitate the gray market.77
II. CHINA’S IPR LAWS AND OBLIGATIONS
Understanding China’s domestic and international IPR obligations is
essential for finding possible avenues to combat gray goods. IPR has
largely been imposed on China by the Western world through a complex

72. As mentioned above, this is the angle that Omega pursued in Costco v. Omega.
See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
73. See Quality King Distrib. Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 153
(1998).
74. This Note focuses on trademark and copyright, as parallel importation of patented
goods has received much attention due to the pharmaceutical industry. For information
on this topic, see Bryan A. Liang, Fade to Black: Importation and Counterfeit Drugs 32
AM. J. L. & MED. 279, 287–88 (2006). For a different angle, see Ben Sihanya, Patents,
Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Experience in
Kenya, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
75. ROTHNIE, supra note 9, at 128, 237, 495.
76. For the defense as applied to trademark, see SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 282–84;
copyright, id. at 218–32. As previously mentioned, the boundaries of this doctrine in the
United States are unclear. The EU does not follow the first sale doctrine, but instead
compensates authors for resale through the idea of “droit de suite.” The UK is waiting to
see how this develops in the United States. For more on first sale internationally, see
Theo Papadapoulos, The First-Sale Doctrine in International Intellectual Property Law:
Trade in Copyright Related Entertainment Products 2 ENT. LAW 40, 50–59 (2003); see
also LEAFFER, supra note 31, at 339 (for a discussion of droit de suite).
77. Exhaustion is multifaceted. It can be applied regionally, nationally, or even internationally. Thus, currently, one may resell intellectual property within the EU, but outside of the EU one may not resell that good without a continuation of the author’s rights.
Miller, supra note 7, at 24, 36–37. For the purposes of this Note, which focuses on
whether China meets its IP obligations in regard to the gray market, evidenced by the
Chinese judiciary and options moving forward, the nuances are tangential. For in depth
discussion, see id.
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system of treaties.78 Although China has made tremendous efforts to assimilate, it still lags behind in meeting widely accepted IPR standards.79
As gray goods have tenebrous legal status in global treaties,80 it is unlikely that treaties provide adequate foundation to pursue action against the
gray market despite enhanced IPR standards. However, China potentially
faces disputes over gray goods with large trading nations even despite
consensus on parallel import legality in the Western world.
A. An Evolution
In 1903, China addressed Western IPR concerns for the first time by
entering into a treaty with the United States providing foreigners with
formal IPR protections.81 Additional attempts to implement IPR protections continued throughout Chinese history, but these were not as successful as intended (from the Western perspective), partly due to “wars,
warlordism, famines, revolutions, and political struggles.”82 Efforts were
further diminished in the communist post-World War II era when the
Chinese Communist Party took control and nationalized commerce, effectively undermining the idea of private or exclusive rights, including
expression.83
China emerged from communism to join the world market in 1978, eager to participate and “put IPRs as one of the priorities on its reform
agenda.”84 In a big step toward hallowing IPR, China joined the WIPO in

78. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 16.
79. For the specific example of software piracy, see Sewell Chan, China Agrees to
Intellectual Property Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at B4. For a broader look at
the evolution of China’s intellectual property measures, see generally WILLIAM ALFORD,
TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE
CIVILIZATION 1–8 (1995).
80. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 298–99.
81. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 32. The treaty “granted copyright, patent, and trademark protection to Americans in return for reciprocal protection to the Chinese.” Peter K.
Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China 6 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Yeshiva Univ., Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property Law, No. 11,
2002) [hereinafter Yu, Second Coming], available at www.peteryu.com/2dcoming.pdf.
82. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 3. China introduced copyright law in 1910,
patent law in 1912, and trademark law in 1923, all of which were reworked after Guomindang came to power in the late 1920s. Id. at 6–7. “Although these laws appeared on
paper, they offered foreigners very limited intellectual property protection.” Id. at 6. This
failure may be attributed to the government’s disappointment that China’s IPR protection
“would not affect China’s semi-colonial status.” Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 7.
84. SHAHID ALIKHAN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 64 (2000).
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1980.85 Over the next two decades, China joined the WIPO’s Paris Convention, 86 the Madrid Agreement in 1989, and the Madrid Protocol in
1995. 87 Importantly, China joined the WIPO’s Berne Convention in
1992.88 The Berne Convention allows a member country to seize illegal
and intellectual property infringing products when imported or found
within its borders.89 Foreign works are protectable under the Berne Convention and do not need to be registered with the nation to be recognized,90 enhancing a foreign owner’s ability to protect goods in member
nations like China. Even though Berne “lacks any enforcement mechanism,”91 the effect on China was immediate.92 Approximately 60% of lite85. WIPO, Contracting Parties, supra note 41.
86. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property emerged in 1883
and protects industrial property like patents and trademarks. WIPO Treaties—General
Information, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
China joined the convention in 1985. Contracting Parties—China, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?search_what=C&country_id=38C (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010).
87. The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Agreement on Marks, Apr
14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389; Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks, adopted June 27, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]. As of 2010, eighty-five countries are in the Madrid Protocol.
Madrid Protocol, supra. The Madrid Protocol and Agreement are known collectively as
the Madrid system, and create a multination trademark recognition system. Summary of
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (1891) and
the
Protocol
Relating
to
that
Agreement
(1989),
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/madrid/summary_madrid.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2010).
88. PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 90 (2d ed. 2003). The Berne
Convention emerged in 1886, when the world collectively addressed intellectual property
rights. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
17 U.S.C. 104, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention
established an administrative body which became the World Intellectual Property Organization in 1967. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (last amended Sept. 28, 1979). The United
Nations later absorbed the organization in 1974. Agreement between the United Nations
and the World Intellectual Property Organization, G.A Res. 3346 (XXIX), U.N.
Doc.A/RES/3346 (XXIX) (Dec. 17, 1974). With 164 signatories, the Berne Convention is
accepted by most trading nations. Contracting Parties—Berne Convention, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Nov. 10,
2010) [hereinafter Contracting Parties—Berne Convention].
89. Creer, supra note 37, at 214.
90. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 15. However, registration is often recommended as “proof.” Id. The Berne Convention only requires “production” of enumerated
expressions, leaving “legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in
general or any specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been
fixed in some material form.” Berne Convention, supra note 88, art. 2, ¶¶ 1–2.
91. Ugolini, supra note 21, at 453.
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rature titles published in China in 1994 were new,93 indicative of the effective incentive of IPR for innovation.
Regardless of China’s improvements, the United States aggressively
pursued IPR reform in China, with U.S.-Chinese disputes budding in the
early 1990s. 94 This watch-dog attitude stems from the United States’
tremendous interest in China’s protection of IPR, as American sales of
goods and services to the Chinese market was recently valued at 98.4
billion USD per year.95 American rumblings gave way to trade tête-àtête, punctuated by the United States’ investigation and mutual sanctions,96 with crisis averted at the last minute by the Sino-American Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property in
1992.97 China promptly improved patent and trademark protections and
upgraded its copyright provisions to satisfy the Berne Convention. 98
Over the next two years China and the United States negotiated twenty
times,99 repeating the same quarrel and, again, culminating in agreement
(the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights) in February of
1995.100 But tensions returned in 1996.101

92. ALIKHAN, supra note 84, at 64.
93. Id.
94. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 32–33. The United States pursued IPR protection
against China in 1991, via Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Id. at 33. Section 301
enables the President to “investigate and impose sanctions on countries engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States’ economic interests.” Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 9.
95. Figure from 2009 referring to multinational American companies engaging in
business with China. Victoria Slind-Flor, Volkswagen, Krka, Pink Floyd: Intellectual
BUSINESSWEEK
(Dec.
16,
2010),
Property,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-16/volkswagen-krka-pink-floydintellectual-property.html. While exact numbers are difficult to obtain due to the issue’s
complexity, intellectual property violations cost American businesses hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars per year. See generally U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N
[USITC], CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION
POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, at xiv–
xvi (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf. The ability
of the U.S. to address these situations is substantial, as TRIPS itself was borne of U.S.
complaints regarding the loss of $50 billion from weak IPR enforcement. CHEUNG, supra
note 32, at 12.
96. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 9.
97. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 5.
98. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 10.
99. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 33.
100. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 11.
101. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 33.
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In response to world expectations,102 China finally joined the WTO on
December 11, 2001.103 In doing so, China agreed to follow the WTO’s
rules regarding trade,104 as participation is hinged on its compliance.105
Members of the WTO are subject to a set “scope” or “minimum standards” of IPR legal protection.106 Through the WTO, China is bound to
the important Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), 107 which structures intellectual property rights’
protection with respect to trade globally.108 TRIPS guidelines establish a
skeleton for intellectual property as it overlaps with trade,109 including
incorporation of the Berne Convention’s standards for copyright110 and
the Paris Convention’s scope for trademarks.111 Of particular relevance to
China, TRIPS’ creation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
102. GANEA, supra note 39, at xiii.
103. WTO, Member Information, supra note 42.
104. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 307.
105. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 12.
106. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 11. TRIPS emerged from the GATT’s Uruguay Round, merging trade and intellectual property protection globally, and now exists
as part of the WTO package. Beatrice Lindstrom, Note, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An
Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implications for
Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 917, 923 (2010). TRIPS requires WTO
nations to observe the Berne, Paris, Rome, International [for the Protection of Performers] Conventions, as well as the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits
(IPIC
Treaty).
Overview:
The
TRIPS
Agreement,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2010).
107. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
108. Intellectual
Property:
Protection
and
Enforcement,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21,
2010).
109. Notably, it establishes “most favored nation treatment” in Article 4, meaning no
special incentives for a favorite trading nation. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 4;
see also WTO, Principles, supra note 57. The WTO explains that if you “[g]rant someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) [] you
have to do the same for all other WTO members.” However, this is a limited concept. Id.
Similarly, TRIPS requires “national treatment” in Article 3, meaning that each nation
must treat the parties as it would its own nationals. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107,
art. 3; see also WTO, Principles, supra note 57. “Member countries may not discriminate
against nationals of one country and in favor of nationals of other countries, whether
those other countries are WTO members or not.” Ugolini, supra note 21, at 455. However, these guidelines are not to be confused with one’s IP rights being the same everywhere—in fact, they may not be recognized at all outside of one’s home nation, under the
concept of territoriality. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 11.
110. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 9.
111. Id. art. 15.
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Trade (“GATT”) also allows developing nations “to use bargaining power and secure trade-offs in negotiating favourable terms.” 112 In accordance with TRIPS, China greatly improved its intellectual property protections113 and is technically in compliance with TRIPS standards.114
China claims that it is in compliance through its enforcement actions as
well.115 TRIPS features obligatory enforcement provisions.116 It creates a
duty to exercise “effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights.”117 The breadth of these enforcement provisions
runs from civil to criminal, administrative to judicial, and even to border
control.118 TRIPS explains that administrative decisions may be subject
to judicial review.119 However, under TRIPS there is no “obligation to
put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general,”120 nor
does it require redistribution of resources for IPR enforcement.121 Thus,
although diverse enforcement mechanisms are established in TRIPS, a
nation does not have any substantive duty to fund enforcement beyond
that which already exists. With no required funding obligations, improvements to enforcement risk being nominal only.
China’s legal opacity is in direct tension with its TRIPS obligations.
TRIPS requires transparency for IPR enforcement as to “[l]aws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application.”122 China, however, only publishes a few of its judicial deci-

112. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 12–13; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107,
pmbl.
113. See Kate Colpitts Hunter, Here There Be Pirates: How China is Meeting its IP
Enforcement Obligations Under TRIPS, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 523, 533–40 (2007). For
details on China’s domestic intellectual property laws, see infra notes 157–81 and accompanying text.
114. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 15. See infra notes 157–81 and accompanying
text.
115. Konstantina K. Athanasakou, China IPR Enforcement: Hard as Steel or Soft as
Tofu? Bringing the Question to the WTO Under TRIPS, 39 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 217, 234
(2007).
116. Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 924.
117. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 41, ¶ 1; see also Tobias Bender, How to
Cope with China’s (Alleged) Failure to Implement the TRIPS Obligations on Enforcement, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 230, 230 (2006).
118. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, pt. 3.
119. Id. at art. 41, ¶ 4.
120. Id. at art. 41, ¶ 5.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 63, ¶ 1.
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sions and shields its internal regulations from the public.123 Nonetheless,
China may claim exemption through a loophole. Confidential information may be omitted if it “would impede law enforcement or otherwise be
contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.”124 China could
claim publishing judicial decisions regarding IPR violations would provide a roadmap for infringers. China’s adherence to transparency may be
weak,125 but arguably so is the actual obligation if it features such a large
exemption.126
Even with enhanced enforcement provisions, TRIPS simply does not
prohibit gray goods.127 TRIPS does provide measures for suspension of
IP violative goods before they enter a market,128 but “does not require
any WTO member to establish border measures for gray market goods,
whether or not the goods are being imported from a country which is part
of the same customs union as the country of importation.”129 Additionally, Article 6 of TRIPS specifically addresses, or rather dodges, the doctrine of first sale or “exhaustion.” Regarding dispute settlements, TRIPS
“shall [not] be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights.”130 China, with excuses from general IP enforcement and
transparency, faces no specific barrier when it comes to gray goods under
TRIPS, and thus its international obligations are likely impotent in the
face of the gray market. Additionally, TRIPS’ avoidance of exhaustion
suggests that the treaty as a whole is not applicable to parallel importation. Without specific provisions delineating TRIPS applicability, its obligations are not strong enough to change China’s gray market.

123. For a discussion of court transparency, see MARTIN DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE
STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 106–08 (2009).
124. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 63, ¶ 4.
125. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 233.
126. China claims that its selected disclosures constitute important information and
decisions, and thus it is in compliance. It claims that those decisions that remain undisclosed are not included under TRIPS’ transparency obligations. For more information,
see id. Additionally, judicial decisions may be increasingly important in China, and thus
transparency may be improving. DIMITROV, supra note 123, at 106–07.
127. Ugolini, supra note 21, at 461.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 465.
130. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art. 6.
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B. International Scrutiny
China faces “severe scrutiny”131 over its TRIPS and WTO Accession
Protocol enforcement obligations,132 which could evolve into formal action to curb parallel importation despite the aforementioned ambiguities.
The United States, in particular, uses the WTO as a means of influencing
China. For example, the Office of the United States Trade Representative
creates an annual Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.133
The report from 2004 includes a proactive plan for IPR advancement in
China, establishing goals of infringement reductions and more intense
enforcement.134 China took this commission seriously, perhaps acknowledging IPR’s gravity for the first time, and attacked rampant violations at
the local level, a critical source of weakness in Chinese enforcement.135
Although there was some progress from this collaboration, China still
lacked the level of control desired by Western nations.136
China could face a WTO suit regarding parallel importation. China’s
WTO status channels its bilateral disagreements through the WTO dispute settlement framework. 137 The Dispute Settlement Understanding
(“DSU”) offers consultations, and if the issue remains unresolved, it then
escalates into a panel review culminating in a report for the parties’ com-

131. China again agreed to pursue transparency, most favored nation status, and national treatment in the WTO Accession Protocol. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 230.
132. Id. at 217.
133. Archives, USTR.GOV, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-andpublications/archives (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
134. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 34. The agreement set out the following pertinent
goals:
(1) significantly reduce IPR infringement levels;
(2) take steps by the end of 2004 to increase penalties of IPR violations . . .
(3) crackdown on IPR violators by conducting nation-wide enforcement action
and increasing customs enforcement actions . . .
....
(5) launch a national IPR education campaign.”
Id., (citing OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), 2004 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 59 (2004)).
135. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 34.
136. Id. at 35.
137. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Understanding (last visited
Dec. 20, 2010).

1092

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:3

pliance.138 The United States has pursued the WTO dispute settlement
process against China eleven times since China joined the WTO, and
another four times with the European Union.139 The last case brought by
the United States against China was decided in 2010,140 demonstrating
commitment to this method.
Although recent utilization of the DSU indicates that the U.S. has some
faith in this method, decisions have been mixed and even unsuccessful
for the United States. Most notably, the United States pursued DSU solutions with China in 2007141 regarding China’s disposal and penalty threshold for infringing goods, and IPR protection and enforcement.142 The
United States claimed China dodged TRIPS by having an impracticably
high eligibility threshold in implementing criminal sanctions against pirates and IP violators.143 China defended its enforcement system, dividing the infringements between high profile criminal cases and smaller
administrative cases.144 Agreeing mostly with China, the WTO did find
that China’s auctions of contraband essentially pushed the items into the
stream of commerce again.145 The United States cited another claim concerning China’s lack of copyright protection for banned works. The
WTO found that China violated TRIPS by denying copyright protection
to certain works, even though China may prohibit the works.146 Although
the United States did not achieve its desired outcome, its small win in

138. Parties also have the option to seek alternate settlement arrangements (arbitration,
etc.) and there is an appellate process. Id.
139. Disputes
by
Country/Territory,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2011). Compare this to India’s four times and the United Kingdom’s three times. Id.
140. This case was over car parts. Id.; see also Elizabeth Williamson & Tom Barkley,
U.S. Beats China in Tire Fight, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703727804576017473322868118.html.
This is not without irony, as one of the key cases in Chinese parallel importation is Michelin regarding tires. The United States also requested consultations three more times in
2010. China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds340_e.htm (last visited May 28,
2011).
141. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362 (Apr. 16, 2008); see also Athanasakou, supra
note 115, at 236.
142. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 218.
143. Peter K. Yu, The US-China WTO Cases Explained, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.,
Oct. 2009, available at http://www.peteryu.com/managingip_362.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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this case and success in later ones suggest that it will likely pursue DSU
under the WTO again.
The United States clearly takes China’s treaty compliance seriously
and uses WTO disputes as a way to mold China’s intellectual property
protection. The United States International Trade Commission continues
to monitor China’s intellectual property infringements and responses.147
With Costco v. Omega’s stalemate further muddying the right of first
sale in the United States,148 the issue of parallel importation is about to
explode.149 A dissatisfied United States (or any other IPR rich nation) 150
could pursue WTO suit, despite TRIPS’ explicit exclusion of exhaustion,
under the veil of pure copyright or trademark law. In fact, the U.S. declared in the 2010 Special 301 Report151 that it “will continue pursuing
the resolution of WTO-related disputes announced in previous Special
301 reviews and determinations,” 152 which includes, of course, issues
with China.
Beyond the WTO, China could also face sanctions from the United
States, among others. 153 The United States’ 2008–2009 Chamber of
147. Gross, supra note 56.
148. Supreme Court Rebuffs Costco in Copyright Challenge, supra note 31.
149. For discussion of Costco v. Omega, see Samuel Brooks, Note, Battling Gray
Markets through Copyright Law: Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 2010
B.Y.U.L. REV. 19 (2010); Daniel Fisher, Costco v. Omega is About Much More than
Cheap Watches, FORBES FULL DISCLOSURE BLOG (Nov. 5, 2010, 1:01 PM),
http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/11/05/costco-v-omega-is-about-much-morethan-cheap-watches.
150. See Bender, supra note 117, at 240.
151. This report is prepared under the authorization of the Trade Act of 1974 §182, 19
U.S.C. 2242 (2010); see also JOHN T. MASTERSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS: ENFORCEMENT AND MANAGEMENT 18–19 (2004). The report identifies
countries that “deny adequate and effective” IPR protection or “deny fair and equitable
market access” to Americans with IPR of concern “priority foreign countries” including
those with policies that have an “adverse impact (actual or potential)” on American
goods. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2010). The 301 report operates under the blessing of the WTO,
and the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act even concluded that fully compliant members
may rightfully be candidates for 301 reports. After IPR-threatening nations have been
identified, an investigation must transpire under provided parameters. Upon the report’s
completion, an affirmative decision will be treated as the basis for potential retaliation.
MASTERSON, supra, at 19–20.
152. AMBASSADOR RON KIRK, OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 16,
SPECIAL
301
REPORT],
available
at
[hereinafter
USTR
2010
http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/root/pdfs/2010_special_301_report.pdf.
153. See id. The negative attention does not come exclusively from the United States,
however. The European Union has been nearly as concerned, and Japan is afraid of the
risk of “serious damage” posed by China’s IPR laxness. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at
220–21. “TRIPS-plus” agreements, bilateral efforts to provide protection beyond TRIPS’
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Commerce Report recommended that China be more vigilant on regional
violative “hotspots,” allocate greater resources for IPR enforcement,
launch criminal investigations focused on the wealthy and the powerful,
and focus on “transborder cases” of violative goods (specific to gray
goods) and “potentially dangerous products” 154 (arguably, unscreened
tires that create peril for drivers). The Chamber of Commerce complained in this report that in spite of the Chinese government’s constant
actions, very little has actually changed. 155 However, more aggressive
steps from the United States and other countries may create significant
and detrimental trade tensions.156
C. Contemporary Chinese Law as is Pertinent to Parallel Importation
While China has only had a few decades to absorb Western IPR,
“[m]ost Western lawyers find the [Chinese] body of [intellectual property] law comprehensive, systematic and wholly familiar.” 157 Mainland
China’s national laws do not ban nor restrict parallel importation. 158
However, pursuant to worldwide pressure, China developed a substantial
IPR statutory scheme which may be used to support anti-gray market
claims, notably the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China in
1982 and the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China in
1990.159
boundaries, have sprouted in an effort to protect trade. Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 919.
Many TRIPS-plus “preferential trade agreements” cater specifically to industry in the
stronger country, including parallel importation problems. Id. at 918, 985–65. However,
stricter agreements may stoke trade tensions as well. Id. at 965.
154. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CHINA’S WTO IMPLEMENTATION AND OTHER
ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE U.S.-CHINA COMMERCIAL
RELATIONSHIP
28
(2008–2009),
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/international/asia/china/files/chinawtosingl
epages.pdf.
155. See id. at 8.
156. Colpitts Hunter, supra note 113, at 548–51.
157. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 14.
158. Angela Wang & Co., Parallel Importation of Goods in Hong Kong and Mainland
(Apr.
30,
2008),
China:
Part
IIMainland
China),
HG.ORG
http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5150. Hong Kong, although increasingly absorbent of
mainland China’s policies, has its own laws regarding parallel importation. See Alison L.
Morr, Comment, Hong Kong’s Copyright Ordinance: How the Ban on Parallel Imports
Affects the U.S. Entertainment Industry and Hong Kong’s Free Market, 21 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 393, 399 (1999).
159. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 66. The Copyright Law was amended in 2001. Id.
While contemporary Chinese trademark law originated in 1982, it was most recently
updated in 2001 with implementing regulations in 2002. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20,
at 15. China has been revising this law since 2008. EU-China Workshop on Revision of
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Chinese trademark law does not expressly prohibit parallel importation.160 However, there are potential protections within the statutory text
for those with trademarks registered in China, via Articles 50 and 52 of
the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China. Article 52(1) explains that trademark violations include “[using a mark] that is identical
or similar to another’s registered trademark on identical or similar goods,
thereby misleading the public.”161 While it is not intuitive that one would
be misled by authentic products, goods entering unauthorized channels
may not go through traditional safety screening processes.162
Article 52 details the broad array of acts that could constitute an infringement:
(1) Use of a trademark that is the same as or similar to a registered
trademark for identical or similar goods without permission of the
trademark registrant;
(2) Sale of any goods that have infringed the exclusive right to use any
registered trademark;
....
(4) Change of any trademark of a registrant without the registrant’s
consent, and selling goods bearing such replaced trademark on the
market; or
(5) Other acts that have caused any other damage to another’s exclusive right to use a registered trademark.163

the Trademark Law, Beijing (Oct. 27–29, 2010), NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.,
http://www.ipr2.org/index.php?view=article&id=1292%3Aeu-china-workshop-onrevision-of-the-trademark-law&option=com_content&Itemid=235 (last visited May 29,
2011). The patent law was also added in 1984 as part of this statutory scheme. CHEUNG,
supra note 32, at 66. For details on specific provisions, see GANEA, supra note 39.
160. Paul B. Birden, Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 18 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 431, 472 (1996). Chinese law prohibits any trademark use or
registration if “a reproduction, imitation, or translation of another person’s trademark
not registered in China and likely to cause confusion.” (emphasis added). CHINA IP
PRIMER, supra note 20, at 18.
161. (中华人民共和国商标法实施条例) [Implementing Provisions for the Trademark
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 3, 2002,
effective Sept. 23, 2002), art. 50(1).
162. For more on this, see infra notes 217–22 and accompanying text.
163. (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong. Aug. 23, 1982, effective Dec. 1 2001), art. 52 [hereinafter Trademark Law (P.R.C.)]. Paragraph (1) of Article
52 has been used as the grant in the past, but (5) is curiously broad. See Protection
Against Parallel Imports in China, VIVIEN CHAN & CO. CHINA NEWSL., July 2010,
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Paragraph (4) explicitly prohibits rebranding a trademark, which is seen
during parallel importation,164 although commentators believe that this is
only targeting “passing off” one brand as another.165 While paragraphs
(1) and (2) are straightforward, (5) provides a gaping opportunity to argue a nontraditional case of infringement; “damage,”166 which is undefined, is sufficient to constitute infringement.167 Arguably, lack of control
over pricing and distribution channels may damage the interests of a
trademark holder.168 However, an investigation into the legislative intent
of Article 52(5) has shown that the act did not include parallel importation as a type of infringement.169 Without proof that it was deliberately
excluded, though, 52(5) may still offer a cause of action.
Copyright protection is sometimes pursued for gray market mitigation,
as trademark is often inadequate.170 However, China’s copyright protections are no savior as they lack a general prohibition on importation of
copyright infringing goods.171 Although imperfect, it does provide a right
of distribution,172 which was the right used to pursue Costco v. Omega in
the United States.173 Another possible source of protection is §15(2) of
http://www.vcclawservices.com/sources/publications/vcc_newsletter_2010_04.pdf [hereinafter Protection Against Parallel Imports in China].
164. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 28. This simply means affixing a
new trademark on a protected good. Id.
165. Id. Passing off constitutes “selling goods of another produce with one’s own trade
mark without consent.” Id. Thus, it is essentially marketing another’s product as one’s
own.
166. Other translations have used the term “prejudice.” Id.
167. Laurie Self & Jason Ma, Amending China’s Trademark Law, IP WORLD, June
2009, at 20.
168. As previously discussed, trademark owners are representing a product to be a
certain quality. Bypassing quality control tests, potential commingling with counterfeit
products, and a possible lack of prestige by less expensive pricing, all potentially injure
the trademark holder’s business. Additionally, forcing a business to compete against itself
due to underselling may damage projected profits. See Hintz, supra note 65, at 1189–90,
for more discussion.
169. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 28.
170. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 213. China’s copyright legislation is based on the 1990
law, updated in 2001, and implementing regulations in 2002. FENG, supra note 88, at
lvii–lviii. It was most recently updated in 2010. 中华人民共和国著作权法 [Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Copyright Law (P.R.C.)].
171. Between Section 46’s eleven enumerated infringing acts and Section 47’s eight,
parallel importation is not touched upon. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at
30.
172. “The right to make the original or reproduced version of a work available to the
public by sale or donation” Copyright Law (P.R.C.), art. 10, ¶ 6.
173. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2008).
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the Provisions on the Implementation of International Copyright Treaties, § 15(2), which states that a copyright holder may prohibit importation of his or her works if the originating country fails to offer protection. 174 Additionally, Article 4 states that “copyright owners shall not
violate the . . . laws and shall not harm the public interest. The State shall
supervise and administrate the publication or dissemination of works in
accordance with the law.”175 The phrase “public interest” could support
its application to the gray market, but a look at the phrase’s evolution
suggests that the legislature likely intended to address censorship, not
parallel importation.176 With no statutory acknowledgement of the gray
market 177 or exhaustion, 178 and broad caveats for governmental discretion, copyright protections for parallel goods have no substantial inhibition. These fragments reflect how IPR protection for parallel importation
in China is often a piecemeal, industry-by-industry method.
The trademark laws provide for civil remedy. With that, compensation
or damages are available179 and administrative agencies may seize and
destroy infringing items and tools.180 Similar procedures exist for copyright infringement. Courts and administrative agencies may confiscate
items and tools of infringement, with “damages of up to RMB 500,000”
and the possibility of preliminary injunction.181
In order to implement these laws, China created administrative bureaus
and substantial penalties.182 These administrative organizations help fill

174. 实施国际著作权条约的规定 [Provisions on the Implementation of International
Copyright Treaties] (promulgated Sept. 25, 1992, effective Sept. 30, 1992), art. 15, ¶ 2.
175. Copyright Law (P.R.C.), art. 4.
176. 1990’s version stated, “Works that are prohibited by law from publication and
dissemination shall not be protected by this Law. A copyright owner in exercising his
copyright shall not violate the Constitution or the law, nor injure public interest.” Copyright Law (P.R.C.), (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l People’s
Cong. Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991), art. 4. This evolved into “[w]orks that are
prohibited from publication or dissemination, as specified by law, shall not be protected
under this Law. In exercising copyrights, the owners thereof shall not violate the Constitution or any other laws, and shall not harm the public interest.” Copyright Law (P.R.C.),
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 27, 2001,
effective Oct. 27, 2001), art. 4.
177. Angela Wang & Co., supra note 158.
178. Zhao Ye & Xu Jing, Software Resale, A Copyright Puzzle, IP BULLETIN (2008),
available
at
http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=Software-Resale-ACopyright-Puzzle&language=en.
179. FENG, supra note 88, at 300.
180. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 28.
181. Id.
182. Athanasakou, supra note 115, at 222.
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the gaps created by a “fledgling court system.”183 In the odd web spun
from a changing government and fractured governance with weight held
by localities, it is not terribly surprising that these administrative offices
are “subordinate to the local governments on the county level.”184 This
fragmentation is a significant hurdle for those pursuing claims. While
there are statutory copyright and trademark protections that may be applicable to the gray market, Chinese enforcement is patchy at best.
III. CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT FAILURE
Chinese IPR enforcement is lacking. Although China claims progress,
79% of counterfeit seizures at U.S. borders originate in China.185 With
timid and infrequent administrative fines, infringers see administrative
actions as simply “a cost of doing business.”186 Additionally, China imposes an extremely high financial and volume threshold before initiating
criminal proceedings.187 China must overcome several hurdles in order to
improve enforcement of IPR, including geographical size, heterogeneous
cultures, local protectionism, and decentralization.188 Due to fragmentation and scale, the country faces “schizophrenic” and inconsistent local
regulations.189 China gestures at enforcement but has not yet adequately
addressed the IPR disaster within its borders. 190 The judicial branch
tracks the patterns of what little enforcement does exist. Copyright decisions uphold the idea of first sale while trademark decisions are patchy
and inconsistent as to whether parallel importation of trademark protected goods will be seen as trademark infringement.
A. China’s Recent Judicial Decisions Regarding the Gray Market
Although judicial decisions may illuminate what truly occurs within
China’s borders, it is important to note that China’s legal system is uniquely structured. Chinese case law has no formal weight, but “exemplary” decisions do guide lower courts.191 Scholar Martin K. Dimitrov
speculates that judicial precedent is increasingly important as China
183. GANEA, supra note 39, at xiv. China’s judiciary was remodeled for WTO accession. Bender, supra note 117, at 235.
184. GANEA, supra note 39, at xiv.
185. Gross, supra note 56 (citing a statistic from The Business Software Alliance).
186. USTR, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, at 20–21 (2010).
187. Id. at 20.
188. Yu, Three Questions, supra note 56, at 421.
189. Id. at 423.
190. This is not to say that China has done absolutely nothing. The 2010 301 Report
lauds the recent Chinese crackdown on piracy. USTR, supra note 186, at 19.
191. FENG, supra note 88, at 33.
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grows.192 By its nature, case law is reflective of China’s true application
of its statutes, a pure example of the state of enforcement. However, case
law is typically not accessible.193 This means that China essentially prevents those outside the court system from any clear view of enforcement
of its statutes and international obligations, perhaps in violation of
TRIPS transparency requirements.
Applicable copyright cases are scant.194 However, in 2008, China decided a case regarding exhaustion and copyright within its borders.
Shanghai Shanjun Industrial Ltd. & Zheng Feng v. Shanghai Jiliang
Software Technology Ltd.195 (“Zheng Feng”) involved legally obtained
software that was resold twice after its first sale. In a novel move, the
Shanghai High People’s Court applied the theory of exhaustion.196 The
court declared, “[o]nce the copyright work . . . [is] initially sold, or gifted
to the public under the license of the copyright owner, the copyright
owner will no longer enjoy the right to control further sale of the work or
its copies.” 197 This concept has also been put forth by Beijing’s High
People’s Court,198 implying consistency throughout China regarding ex-

192. DIMITROV, supra note 123, at 107.
193. Some cases are published in the PRC Supreme People’s Court Gazette. Id. at 32.
194. At time of publication of this (cited) guide just six years ago, there were no decisions pertinent to the parallel market. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 31.
However, since then, it appears at least one has occurred.
195. Shanghai Shanjun Indust. Ltd. & Zheng Feng v. Shanghai Jiliang Software Tech.
Ltd.,
(Shanghai
Interm.
People’s
Ct.,
May
14,
2008),
http://ipr.chinacourt.org/public/detail_sfws.php?id=18193. (This source is in Chinese.)
As China does not publish many of its cases, the four important cases discussed in this
Note have imperfect citations. As the details of the cases have been explained by experts,
this Note uses the most formal names and citations used in the experts’ discussions.
196. Zhao Ye & Xu Jing, supra note 178.
197. Id.
198. Answers of the Beijing High People’s Court to Certain Questions Regarding the
Trial of Cases Involving Copyright Disputes, Beijing High People’s Court, Jing Gao Fa
Fa [1996] No. 460.
18. Is a person who has purchased the reproductions of a work distributed upon
authorization of the copyright owner allowed to resell such reproductions without the consent of the copyright owner?
Answer: Once a certain volume of reproductions of a work has been distributed
upon authorization of the copyright owner, the copyright owner’s sale right in
such volume of reproductions of the work shall be deemed to have been used
up and shall be prohibited from being used any longer. With respect to reproductions of the work distributed upon authorization of the copyright owner,
others’ resale of such reproductions purchased by them shall be exempted from
consent of the copyright owner. Id.
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haustion. However, future cases will be necessary to see if copyright exhaustion is truly emerging as Chinese policy.
Trademark, on the other hand, appears to be growing as a method of
protection against parallel importation in China. Shanghai Unilever Co.
Ltd. v. Commercial Importing and Exporting Trading Co. of Guanghzou
Economic Technology Developing District, Hui Zhong Fa Shi Chu Zi
(“LUX”)199 was the first parallel importation case ever tried in China, to
mixed results.200 LUX, a popular soap brand, faced parallel importation
issues in mainland China. In September of 1997 and again in 1998, the
plaintiff secured appropriate licensing with Unilever for use of the LUX
trademark in China.201 The plaintiff publicized its newly obtained license
and filed with the State Trademark Office and General Administration of
Customs.202 In 1999, customs officials in Guangdong seized nearly 900
boxes of LUX soap created for the Thai market, en route to China from
Thailand. 203 The plaintiff brought suit against the parallel importer,
claiming that it violated the company’s exclusive right to use its trademark, and asked for the court to enjoin the defendant from importing and
selling LUX soap, apologize publically, and reimburse the plaintiff for its
losses.204
The parallel importer claimed that since the soap truly was authentic,
there could be no violation. Additionally, the parallel importer claimed
that this case was a “typical” parallel import instance, with properly
trademark protected goods intended for sale in Thailand. 205 The court
rejected this argument, saying it lacked sufficient documentation of
proper licensing for Thailand, much less China.206 It held that because
the trademark was published, it violated trademark law by failing to
show that the product originated from the owner of the trademark or that
such importation was approved by the trademark owner.207 This lack of

199. Shanghai Unilever Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Imp. & Exp. Trading Co. of Guanghzou Econ. Tech. Developing Dist., Hui Zhong Fa Shi Chu Zi (Guangzhou Interm.
People’s Ct., June 1999). A more developed citation was unavailable at the time this Note
was drafted.
200. Yang Jinqi, Trademark Infringement in Parallel Import, 62 CHINA PATENTS AND
TRADEMARKS (IP QUARTERLY), no. 3, July 2000, at 31; see also PARALLEL IMPORTS IN
ASIA, supra note 19, at 28–30.
201. Jinqi, supra note 200.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Angela Wang & Co., supra note 158.
205. PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA, supra note 19, at 29.
206. Id.
207. Jinqi, supra note 200, at 32.
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authorization was fatal. 208 The court ordered three remedies: financial
compensation of LUX’s loss, an order to stop importation of LUX soap,
and the court added that the defendant must issue a public apology in the
regional newspaper.209
Critics of the decision were dissatisfied by the way the court dodged
the question of whether parallel importation is illegal under trademark
law. 210 By denying that this case was actual parallel importation, the
court left ample room for maneuvering. The showmanship around the
decision, namely the public apology, may indicate that the court wanted
to make a grand public statement regarding Chinese enforcement.
However grand the LUX conclusion may have been, in 2000, the Fahuayilin Trading Co. v. Beijing Century Hengyuan Tech. & Trading
Ltd.211 (“An’ge”) case deviated from its course.212 The court in An’ ge
addressed similar arguments as in LUX, that the plaintiff’s exclusive license was violated and that this constituted unfair competition. The
court, instead of following the logic delineated by LUX, held that the defendants were just employing typical legal business operations, agreeing
with the defendant’s assertion that the parallel importer followed proper
procedure. 213 The judge explained that a contract between two parties
could not be imposed upon a third party.214 Additionally, highlighting a
loophole in the statutes, the judge stressed that nothing says that the
people who buy the products “must be the direct consumers or users.”215
Essentially, Beijing’s An’Ge authorized like situations only with respect
to wholesale purchasers, not the full scope of parallel importation.216
The 2009 Michelin217 decision created further discomfort in the treatment of trademark infringement by gray goods. The Michelin Group
sued two tire dealers who were importing, without permission, real Mi208. See Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163.
209. Jinqi, supra note 200, at 32.
210. Id.
211. Fahuayilin Trading Co. v Beijing Century Hengyuan Tech. and Trading Ltd. (Beijing, 2002). A more complete citation was unavailable at the time this Note was drafted.
See also Grace Li, China, PHARMACEUTICAL TRADEMARKS 2009—A GLOBAL GUIDE 7, 8
(2009),
available
at
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/issues/Article.ashx?g=4e74f91e-6b26-44f0-a03f286269affea5.
212. Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Li, supra note 211.
217. Michelin Grp v. Tan Guoqiang & Ou Ca (Changsha Interm. People’s Ct Apr. 24,
2009).
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chelin tires.218 The court held that, similarly to LUX, the trademark included right of importation. However, the decision turned on the fact that
the Michelin trademark implied that the tires underwent official quality
control testing.219 The gray tires entered China indirectly and thus were
never subject to government testing via the China Compulsory Product
Certification (3C) system.220 Without this quality control, these tires were
essentially different products. The court pointed out that subsequently,
the tires were technically illegal. 221 The court was concerned that unknowing consumers would then attribute any faulty tires to Michelin,
thus damaging the trademark and company’s reputation.222
Michelin seems to build further support for trademark protection as a
barrier to the gray market. However, the logic of the decision may have
created a significant loophole. If a product is not directly related to safety, and does not receive mandatory tests, it is unclear if it would face a
similar barrier.
In the aftermath of these three trademark cases, it appears that the Chinese judiciary is trying to show some support for the protection of international trademarks. However, the quality loophole, legality of parallel
goods, lack of judicial weight, and general unavailability of published
cases make application of trademark law subject to whim. Additionally,
LUX’s newspaper apology appears suspiciously cosmetic, publically announcing a rights holder’s success. It is possible that China may just be
diverting attention from an agenda of development and satisfying one of
the world’s largest economies. Paired with the apparent enforcement of
exhaustion, it seems that gray goods face limited restrictions under intellectual property laws in China. Rights holders’ success appears to be at
the discretion of the judiciary.
B. Potential Reasons for Weak IPR Enforcement and Disincentive to
Prevent Parallel Imports
Placing the above cases in context, China’s relationship with IPR enforcement is tenuous for many reasons. Although development is often
said to require IPR,223 this may not be the case in China. Experts conflict
218. Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163; see also Fu Haiying, Trademark Infringement in Parallel Importation, CHINA LAW INSIGHT (Oct. 21
2010), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/10/articles/intellectual-property/trademarkinfringement-in-parallel-importation.
219. Protection Against Parallel Imports in China, supra note 163.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. ALIKHAN, supra note 84, at 1.
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on the value of such protections to developing economies. Innovation is a
key element to a blossoming economy, and continued growth may rely
on innovative advancements. 224 Contrary to the traditional belief that
there exists a “positive correlation between high protection and [research
and development] . . . Overprotective terms may actually limit innovation.” 225 With enormous resources and quick change, China has seen
“various truncated, if not zigzag, ways of development.”226 Thus, it is not
surprising that it may experience growth without traditional IPR protections. However, this is not unique to China. The United States, arguably
China’s biggest critic, did not sign the Berne Convention in 1886 with
the rest of the Western world, 227 leaving famed authors like Charles
Dickens underprotected by contemporary standards.228 Instead, the United States protected its developing economy at the detriment of international IPR holders.229 The United States officially joined the Berne convention over a century later in 1988, at that time with a ferocious and
long dominant economy.230
Some argue that China will correct its IPR policies when the economy
is stronger,231 as the United States did. Primarily, large companies born
of such a vibrant economy will require their own protections.232 Perhaps
China is already at this stage. After winning the opportunity to host the
Chinese 2008 summer games, China created Olympics-specific laws,
enabling criminal punishment for the unauthorized selling of products
with the Olympics logo.233 China finally had something to lose with lax
IPR protections.234 However, even with new protections, new laws were
224. Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 921.
225. Id.
226. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at xiii.
227. Many nations signed the original, with official implementation in 1887. Contracting Parties—Berne Convention, supra note 88.
228. CHINA IP PRIMER, supra note 20, at 14.
229. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 307.
230. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
231. See CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 20–21.
232. SUGDEN, supra note 7, at 307.
233. Geoffrey Fowler, China’s Logo Crackdown, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2005, at B1;
see also Doris E. Long, Protection in China, Post-Olympics, NAT’L L.J. (N.Y.), Aug. 18,
2008,
available
at
http://www.jmls.edu/academics/ip_law/NLJ%20%20Doris%20Long%20IP%20China%20Article%20Aug%2018%2008.pdf). China made
“[a] significant advance in IP protection by broadening the potential administrative avenues for relief and providing a more rational basis for determining fines and penalties.”
Id.
234. Elizabeth Ferrill, Clearing the Swamp for Intellectual Property Harmonization:
Understanding and Appreciating the Barriers to Full TRIPS Compliance for Industrializing and Non-Industrialized Countries, 15 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137, 169 (2007).
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no match for China’s “serious and entrenched” 235 IPR problems, and
Olympic products were still counterfeited, although to a lesser degree.236
Regardless of the potential governmental changes ahead, China faces
tremendous cultural roadblocks. Chinese communist rule imposed a
moral and philosophical understanding that, “[a]uthors thus create literary and artistic works for the welfare of the State, rather than for the
purpose of generating economic benefits for themselves.”237 The sin of
ownership paired with the Maoist suppression of independent thought
and the criticism of the “intelligentsia”238 created a notion of distrust and
disrespect of the Western concept of ownership. In particular, all inventions that would be patentable by individuals in today’s society belonged
to the government during that era, and China recognized nominal trademark abilities and no copyright protection.239
Additionally, China’s Confucian roots pose a far deeper stumbling
block. 240 “Imitation and reproduction of ideas, art and scholarship are
considered tokens of honor and respect . . . ,” thus, “ . . . protection of
intellectual property rights is not a concept that first easily into a Confucian society, where copying is often and integral part of the learning
process.”241 Additionally, the remains of Confucianism may have created
an “entrenched tradition of regarding laws as an inefficient, arbitrary, and
cumbersome instrument for governance.”242 The Chinese culture that met

235. Yu, Three Questions, supra note 56, at 420–21.
236. Long, supra note 233.
237. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 18. “Maoist” refers to Mao Zedong, who
led China as the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China during the communist era.
See JONATHAN CLEMENTS, MAO ZEDONG 91–93 (2006). “Intelligentsia” refers to the intellectual social class. See ALFORD, supra note 79, at 63–65.
238. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 18–19 (discussing ALFORD, supra note 79,
at 63–64).
239. Ferrill, supra note 234, at 157.
240. Confucius, the philosopher, inspired Chinese lifestyle for “more than two millenBRITANNICA,
nia.”
Confucianism,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132104/Confucianism, (last visited Dec. 20,
2010). For a detailed discussion as it pertains to this Note, see ALFORD, supra note 79, at
19–28.
241. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 20.
242. Yu, Second Coming, supra note 81, at 24. “The Chinese lived by the concept of li
(rites), rather than the concept of fa (law).” Id. Under this conceptual perspective, laws
are not “‘a detailed, comprehensive and self-containing rule system, justifiable on ideological as well as jurisprudential grounds, with coherent principles and well defined concepts.’ They also can be ‘incomplete, incoherent, ideologically compromising, as well as
broadly and vaguely termed pending further administrative and judicial experience in its
implementation.’” Id. at 25 (quoting FENG, supra note 88, at 11). Additionally, laws are
often flexible and can be ephemeral. Id.
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the world just thirty-two years ago was bred to be intellectual property
protection averse.
Another facet complicating Chinese compliance is that the Chinese
economy is arguably too big,243 with too much growth, too fast.244 The
most populous nation in the world is suddenly faced with consumerism
transformative of “. . . China’s economic landscape as well as contest[ing] Chinese people’s acceptance and compliance of the global
norms.”245 Since China joined the market societies of the world, “and the
call for ‘getting rich is glorious,’” it has been forced to partner its cultural
norms (discussed above) with “the thrust of the ‘get rich first’ mentality.”246 This economic momentum paired with traditional IPR averse values threatens Western IPR notions and protection.
Beyond the fact that China’s current stage of society may be incompatible with IPR protection, the Western world does not provide productive
guidance on parallel importation. Costco v. Omega sent an unclear message about the United States’ position on parallel importation, shirking a
declaration or disavowal of the international application of the first sale
doctrine.247 Additionally, as Peter Yu points out, between Canal Street’s
knock-off watches and College Hill laptops playing illegally downloaded
mp3s, the United States arguably doesn’t prioritize IPR enforcement itself.248 Accordingly, IPR protection is low on the United States-China
agenda, below nuclear nonproliferation and currency exchange, or “at the
top of the second list.”249 If IPR protection itself is secondary, parallel
importation is tertiary despite economic interests. Logically, the quality
of the U.S.’ persuasion on this topic is likely commensurate with its prioritization.250
Paired with jurisdictional confusion and decentralization,251 Confucian
and communist beliefs impede IPR protection. The nation’s rapid growth
243. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at 21.
244. “The sheer scale of China’s growth, as her economy expands vigorously (at
around 10 per cent a year), brings bad as well as good consequences.” CHINA IP PRIMER,
supra note 20, at 14.
245. CHEUNG, supra note 32, at xiv.
246. Id. at 97.
247. Supreme Court Rebuffs Costco in Copyright Challenge, supra note 31.
248. Yu, Three Questions, supra note 56, at 416. “Even in the United States—or, for
that matter, any other developed country—the protection of intellectual property rights is
generally considered to be of lower priority than the resolution of such domestic problems as the prevention of murders, burglaries, robberies, thefts, arsons, assaults, and distribution of narcotics and child pornography.” Id.
249. Id. at 414–16.
250. Id. at 415.
251. DIMITROV, supra note 123, at 274.
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further hinders IPR protection, but may eventually incentivize copyright
and trademarks enforcement. Conflicting messages from the United
States do not clarify the issue’s importance. Thus, a new strategy is necessary.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD
The scarcity and inconsistent nature of China’s published judicial decisions indicates that its IPR enforcement is still virtually nonexistent when
compared to the number of violations. Thus, pragmatically, the problem
of gray goods in China should be addressed directly. This requires a two
pronged action: enhanced Chinese IPR enforcement and creation of a
specific action for gray goods across borders.
There is a patchwork of suggested solutions throughout the international community. Some solutions focus on China’s internal growth. Yu
suggests increasing public awareness; however, there have already been
significant advancements toward educating the public in China,252 to little avail. Most suggestions require international involvement. Some have
suggested establishing an international venue for disputes addressing
intellectual property. 253 This may not be successful as many countries
would have to “surrender” significant sovereignty.254 Emerging and developing economies like China would likely not join for protectionist
development reasons,255 undermining the purpose. Other proposed solutions include taxing imports on all intellectual property to build a fund
for enforcement,256 but this penalizes creation and does not address cultural attitudes. Additionally, there will be difficulty convincing emerging
economies to use this money for the sole purpose of IPR enforcement,
when larger problems (infrastructure, energy, etc.) loom. It has also been
suggested that the wealthy economies should subsidize enforcement of
IPR in foreign nations, 257 a strange bedfellow of technology transfer.
This would penalize Western creation in favor of developing nations’
native IPR, and would face similar problems as the previous solutions.

252. Peter K. Yu, Conference-U.S.-China Trade: Opportunities and Challenges: Still
Dissatisfied After All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO China, and the
Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 152 (2005).
253. Creer, supra note 37, at 242. Creer suggests that an international court would
force emerging nations, like China, to be measured by the same standard as the rest of the
world. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Lindstrom, supra note 106, at 921–22.
256. Creer, supra note 37, at 242.
257. Id. at 243.
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Even if the nations of the world embraced such solutions, these ideas
miss the essence of the problem: the gray market is not illegal as it exists
without trademark or significant copyright violations, and thus needs to
be targeted directly. The deliberate distance from the gray market in
TRIPS arguably allows parallel importation. WTO member countries
need not adopt border measures as to “goods put on the market in another country with the consent of the right holder.”258 Additionally, TRIPS
does not require members to “devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement than other areas of law enforcement.”259 Without muscle from the strongest applicable treaty, China’s behavior is unlikely to
change.
The logic is very simple: make parallel importation illegal globally.
However, the simplicity of such an argument faces fatal hurdles. It is
doubtful that the world will agree universally on all the facets of the parallel importation problem, as the United States has no clear official policy and international treaties deliberately sidestep the issue. Even if consensus is reached, it will take time to get the many trading nations of the
world to literally “sign on” to such a treaty. Thus, it must be approached
from a more creative angle.
Pragmatically, the United States and other nations need to be forthcoming about their concern regarding parallel products. As parallel imports mingle with black market goods in the gray market, the former are
arguably less damaging than counterfeited goods, and thus may be prioritized below counterfeits. In the interim, however, major companies are
losing significant sums of money. While this may just be the downside of
a global economy, if the corporations of the United States, European Union, and others are so highly impacted, the parent nations must be proactive. Companies should be vigilant themselves, and proactively pursue
existing enforcement mechanisms,260 but further international trade negotiations must transpire.
To effectively address parallel importation, the United States, Japan,
Australia, and China, or ideally all of the major trading nations (with essential Chinese participation), must create a treaty, targeting gray goods,
through the avenue of trademark protection. This treaty must use explicit
language, stating that such violations in pursuit of the gray market, in
excess of an agreed amount, will be subject to a specific and uniform
punitive trademark violation/parallel import tariff. With internationally
258. Ugolini, supra note 21, at 461 (quoting TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, art.
51, ¶ 13).
259. Yu, Three Questions, supra note 56, at 418 (citing TRIPS Agreement, supra note
107, art. 41, ¶ 5).
260. Long, supra note 233.
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agreed price equalization, a limitation to right of first sale could be preserved if a nation so chooses, but governments could temper the effect of
gray goods on industry. China will need to enforce this provision, seeking out violations and taxing gray goods. Unfortunately, this likely depends on China’s emergence as a developed nation.
Given this time lag, reality will likely show that companies who benefit from globalization will have to accept the bad with the good. IPRs are
only valid in the state in which they are granted,261 and it is important to
remember that even in the United States such rights are not absolute.
These companies, who have been lobbying countries for protection and
thus international action, may have to approach the market knowing the
consequences and taking preventative measures that account for potential
parallel importing, like dubbing films in the target language.262
CONCLUSION
While China has implemented an impressive, comprehensive written
statutory system protecting intellectual property to Western standards,
copyright and trademark claims from parallel importation are not gaining
the traction seen in developed countries around the world. China’s weak
IPR enforcement pertaining to parallel imports is highlighted by its
patchy judicial decisions. While it appears that the first sale doctrine exists to some degree, limiting copyright claims, trademark protection continues to compete with parallel importation. Although at least three cases
have been decided on the topic, and the only clarification is that safety
inspections of a product will alter the product’s status. Instead, China
seems to simply gesture to its international treaty obligations, but still
hides behind its ability to grow its economy and cultural differences.
While WTO action from the United States and European Union could
follow, this process is proving impotent. Unless there is a specific pact
and tariff, parallel importation will likely remain one of the negatives
(from the corporate and developed nation perspective) of globalization.
In order to compete globally, one must set prices to sell in each market,
and the gray market is an undeniable side effect. While there is some
legal protection in affluent developed countries, this issue may deepen
the schism of development.
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